Commitments Bonds, 100 Georgetown Law Journal 605 (2012) (with Michael Abramowicz).
A Market Test for Credit Cards, Forbes (June 25, 2009).
Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts are Justified, 95 California Law Review 669 (2007).
Just What the Professor Ordered, New York Times A27 (Sept. 16, 2005).
Going Soft on Microsoft? The EU’s Antitrust Case and Remedy, The Economists’ Voice, Vol. 2: No. 2, Article 4 (2005) http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss2/art4 (with Barry Nalebuff)..
Microsoft I: A Remedy Worthy of Solomon, New York Times (Oct. 12, 2004) (with Barry Nalebuff).
Why Legislating Low Tuitions for State Colleges is a Mistake: They Just Subsidize the Rich, Writ Findlaw’s Legal Commentary (October 30, 2003) (with Aaron Edlin).
In Praise of Honest Pricing, 45 MIT Sloan Management Review 24 (Fall 2003)(with Barry Nalebuff).
2000 Monsanto Lecture in Tort Reform and Jurisprudence: Using Tort Settlement To Cartelize, 34 Valparaiso University Law Review 595 (2000).
Comment [on “The Tobacco Deal” by Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer], in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 395 (1998).
Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Michigan Law Review 985 (1999) (with Paul Klemperer).
“Pro-competitive Executive Compensation” as a Condition for Approval of Mergers that Simultaneously Exploit Consumers and Enhance Efficiency, 19 Canadian Competition Record 18 (Spring 1998) (with Stephen F. Ross).
Breaking Windows: Why the Justice Department Should Go After the Microsoft Monopoly, The New Republic 18 (Nov. 17, 1997).
Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theorem, 17 Mississippi College Law Review 21 (1996). See also Electronic Discussion, 17 Mississippi College Law Review 91, 93, 102 (1996).
Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 Stanford Law Review 761 (1996) (with Peter Cramton).
Partial Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 California Law Review 13 (1992) (with John Braithwaite).
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press 1992) (with John Braithwaite). Buy a copy.
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale Law Journal 729 (1992) (with Rob Gertner).
Colleges in Collusion, The New Republic 19 (October 16, 1989).
The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 Tulane Law Review 971 (1989) (with Peter Siegelman) reprinted 4 National Insurance Law Review 1 (1990) and 4 Insurance Law Anthology 501 (1989-1990).
Determinants of Airline Carrier Conduct, 8 International Review of Law & Economics, 187 (1988).
How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 Columbia Law Review 295 (1987).
Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 Yale Law Journal 109 (1985).