Gun (Self) Control

Ian Ayres* & Fredrick E. Vars**

Abstract: Individuals should have the option to waive their Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms by adding their names to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. Every year about 20,000 Americans kill themselves with firearms. We present a low-cost and constitutional system that could in just a few years easily save thousands of lives as people with mental health or other recurring problems during moments of clarity rationally opt to restrain their future selves. Moreover, our system, which includes the option of providing email notifications of an individual’s waiver to third parties, can promote a marketplace of informed association. Just as Heller emphasizes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as furthering the “core” individual right to self-defense, credibly communicated waiver of Second Amendment rights can facilitate the self-defense choices of individuals to limit association with those who may possess weapons. Forcing Second Amendment interests to contend with First Amendment associational interests can thus enhance the joint liberty of those seeking to best defend themselves. We provide the results of two surveys showing that close to a third of the general population and more than 40% of those with previously diagnosed mental health concerns indicated that they would be willing to add their name to a “No Guns” list.

*William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. ian.ayres@yale.edu.

** Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Bruce Ackerman, Joseph Blocher, John Donohue, Jack Hitt, Al Klevorick, Mel Kohn and seminar participants at Duke and University of Texas law schools provided helpful comments. Griffin Austin, Greg Conyers, Anthony Cozart, Samuel Dong, Amen Jalal and Tracy Nelson provided excellent research assistance.
Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3

I. Scope .................................................................................................................................................. 8
   A. Informational Prerequisites ........................................................................................................... 8
   B. Choice Architecture ..................................................................................................................... 11

II. Who Would Waive .......................................................................................................................... 19
   A. Theory .......................................................................................................................................... 19
   B. Empiricism ................................................................................................................................... 25
   C. MTurk Survey .............................................................................................................................. 27
   D. The Alabama Survey .................................................................................................................... 32
   E. The Bottom-Line: Estimated Lives Saved .................................................................................... 33

III. Libertarian Contracting and its Limits ......................................................................................... 34

IV. Implementation ............................................................................................................................... 40

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 42

Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 45
I N T R O D U C T I O N

Two-and-a-half years ago, Cheryl Hanna had many reasons to be happy.1 At 48, she was a tenured professor at Vermont Law School beloved by students and colleagues alike. She was married with two adorable children Samira and Elias, ages 11 and 8. She had achieved much professionally with publication in elite journals and was an acknowledged expert on violence against woman. But Hanna was privately battling severe depression. She had twice voluntarily admitted herself to a hospital for psychiatric treatment. Shortly after her second hospitalization, she legally bought a handgun and used it the next day to kill herself.2

People at risk for suicide, like Hanna, should have the option to make it more difficult for themselves to buy a gun during a suicidal crisis. A simple change to state law would give individuals the ability to add their own names into the existing federal background check system and thereby prevent themselves from buying a gun from a licensed dealer. This legal possibility is not a pipe-dream. During the time that this article has been in draft, the ideas advanced here have gained legislative traction across the country. Several states have draft legislation and five states, California, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin, have introduced legislation that would create registries that would give citizens the ability to exercise their right to not to bear arms.3 Indeed, this liberty-enhancing proposal has attracted support from politically diverse constituencies. On January 26, 2018, the Washington state senate voted unanimously – Republicans and Democrats alike -- in favor of voluntary firearm waiver bill (on which we consulted) that may become law within a few months.4

The individual right to keep and bear arms includes the right of individuals to make choices about how best to defend themselves---for some people that means choosing not to keep and bear arms. While we will often describe our proposal as giving individuals the option to waive their Second Amendment rights, it can more formally be seen as giving the individuals an additional way to exercise their constitutional right to not bear arms.5 Government should give individuals the right to commit not to purchase and possess guns and give them the additional right to credibly communicate that commitment to others. Just as it is constitutional for individuals to contract to bear arms,6 it is constitutional for government to allow individual commitment not to bear arms.

2 Id.
5 Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012). Even if a positive constitutional right not to bear arms does not exist, states can still offer this option without running afoul of Second Amendment rights.
While we will discuss giving individuals a variety of waiver choices, we will focus attention on an Internet platform that gives individuals: (1) an all-or-nothing option of registering to cede their right to purchase or possess firearms, (2) the option to automatically rescind any prior registration after a 21-day waiting period, and (3) the option of providing email addresses that will be automatically notified of an individual’s waiver or its subsequent rescission. Because our proposed system would give waiving individuals the option of automatically regaining full rights to purchase and possess after 21 days, our proposal is equivalent to giving individuals the right of opting into a waiting period, a fully constitutional commitment technique already employed in a number of states. In a sense, our proposal provides individuals with a virtual gun safe: by registering for self-exclusion they can commit to safely being dispossessed of firearms with the waiting period representing the time needed to reopen the legal lockbox. Indeed, the state might give registering individuals a more literal lockbox, by offering to store any firearms with local police while a registration is in effect. The state routinely creates “sticky” rights – such as marriage – where reversing an initial exercise requires time or effort.

This article details how modest changes to state law could create these new rights by allowing individuals to add their names to the existing National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”). The NICS “No Guns” list already prevents certain individuals (e.g., convicted felons) who are prohibited from possessing guns from purchasing firearms from gun dealers. The NICS statute gives states the option of adding new categories of its residents to the federal “No Guns” list (and states have already exercised this option by passing statutes which have added more than 100,000 to the federal list). By passing a statute that prohibits voluntary registrants from purchasing and possessing guns (and forwarding the registrants names to NICS), states can create a credible system whereby registrants will be incapacitated from purchasing a firearm from gun dealers not only in their state of registry but throughout the country. Far from creating a huge new federal bureaucracy, our proposal imposes no additional burdens on gun dealers and merely requires a credible mechanism for registration – something that has been accomplished by hundreds of online finance and commerce websites as well as several on-line government portals administered by the IRS and the Social Security Administration.

---

9 F.B.I., NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS (2014), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2014-operations-report [visited 6/14/16]. Alternatively, states with their own existing background check system could use those systems rather than NICS. The big downside of using state databases is that they will not have extra-territorial effect. In other words, a resident of Vancouver, Washington could effectively “rescind” the waiver and immediately purchase a firearm simply by driving across the border to Portland, Oregon.
10 Id. at 17.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 23-24 (discussing these government portals).
Facilitating these options to waive and to communicate such waiver is likely to produce three social benefits: (1) self-exclusion, (2) negotiated-exclusion, and (3) political expression. First, the waiver right will reduce gun violence as those who rationally want to limit their future selves from misusing guns will be able to tie their hands against future misuse. Just as state gambling self-exclusion registries allow individuals to commit not to gamble at casinos in the future, a “No Guns” registry allows people who know they have mental health problems to self-exclude from the dangers of gun ownership. The story of Ulysses tying his hands to the mast is a frequent metaphor for pre-commitment proposals, but the analogy is especially close because Ulysses’ present self was worried that his future self would become delusional and do harm to himself or others. There are hundreds of thousands of people in the United States suffering from mental health illnesses who realize during moments of clarity that their future selves are at risk of misusing firearms. In this article, we detail the results of a new survey in which more than 40 percent of people who self-reported that they had been previously “diagnosed with a mental disorder” indicate that they would be willing to waive their rights to bear arms. Approximately 20,000 Americans kill themselves each year with firearms. One study estimated that a person’s risk of suicide in California in the first week after a gun purchase is fifty-seven times the rate in the general population. This proposal would not only incapacitate registrants from purchasing firearms but also expose registrants to the risk of prosecution, further deterring firearm purchase or possession. Based on our surveys and ancillary empiricism, we conservatively estimate that a self-exclusion registry would annually save hundreds of lives.

Second, the right to credibly communicate one’s waiver can facilitate negotiated-exclusion and thereby enhance libertarian autonomy. Our proposal would also give individuals registering for the “No Guns” list the option of including email addresses of individuals or entities that the participants want to receive notice of waiver and of any subsequent rescission. Providing the email address of healthcare professionals can not only provide immediate information about a patient’s risk profile, but also alert the professional if the patient subsequently chooses to rescind their waiver. The health care professional would have 21 days to inquire whether the rescinding patients was likely to be a danger to himself or others.

---

12 IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS DONE (2010).
14 See infra Fig.2.
17 Based on rough estimates, the federal mental health prohibition on both purchase and possession prevents 18-50% more suicides than the effective prevention of purchase alone. Compare Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2013), with Fredrick E. Vars & Griffin Edwards, Slipping Through the Cracks? The Impact of Reporting Mental Health Records to the National Firearm Background Check System (under submission).
18 One might imagine over time that the standard of care for physicians might be not only to offer registration options for at-risk patients, see infra note 34 (discussing Massachusetts registry bill), but also for physicians to
This option to credibly communicate whether one has waived can also facilitate informed association. Currently, the association marketplace is skewed because it is far easier to demonstrate that one is exercising the right to bear arms than that one is exercising the right not to bear arms. A condo association that wants to require gun possession can require that residents physically reveal to management the presence of a firearm in their unit. But without a registry it would be more difficult for an association to verify that residents do not possess firearms. Our proposed registry evens the evidentiary terrain.

The article describes why cotenants, landlords and homeowners’ associations, as well as life and property insurers, have legitimate self-defense interests in conditioning their association on other people’s waiver of the right to purchase and possess firearms. Individuals who by themselves would not be willing to self-exclude from gun ownership may voluntarily opt to waive their firearm rights in order to secure particular associational opportunities. Just as citizens routinely waive their First Amendment free speech rights in order to associate with others, a government sponsored “No Guns” registry with optional email notices to third parties can promote social welfare by forcing Second Amendment rights to compete with the First Amendment. This article’s notion of gun control is “libertarian” not only in that it gives the individual enhanced rights to durably commit to not bear arms but also in that it allows others to condition their association on such waiver. Opening up the individual’s arming decision to the associational marketplace might save annually not hundreds, but thousands of lives lost to gun violence.

Third, and finally, the right to credibly communicate one’s waiver can also facilitate political expression. The option to register to waive one’s rights publicly might be used to send a signal to fellow citizens and to representatives the registrants’ support of legislative action to limit gun violence. By disclosing the total number of waivers, the registry could publicly signal aggregate support while preserving individual anonymity. Moreover, a registering individual could also provide the email address of private gun control groups and by registering for the “No Guns” list simultaneously add their name to a private petition. The “No Guns” list could thus become a particularly powerful way to publicly show support by signaling the number of people who were willing to waive their Second Amendment rights. We present below results of an Amazon MTurk survey indicating that close to a third of respondents were willing to add their name to their state’s “No Guns” list. Mass shootings predictably lead some segments of the population to purchase weapons. But after Newtown or Las Vegas, other segments of the population want to be able to do something to express their support for gun control laws. The

---

inquire about an at-risk patient’s mental health after receiving registry notice that such a patient had begun the process to rescind her waiver (or had attempted, while registered, to purchase a gun). See Mau Longjohn & Katherine Christoffel, Are Medical Societies Developing A Standard For Gun Injury Prevention?, 10 INJURY PREVENTION 169 (2004) (detailing evolving standards of care of 14 societies regarding gun injury prevention).

ability to give up your right to bear arms could thus be a way for like-minded Americans to make common cause and express solidarity with one another.

While our proposal would allow a waiving party to credibly communicate his or her waiver to any and all recipients, we simultaneously recognize that allowing some third parties to condition their willingness to associate (including economically associate via contracting) raises constitutional concerns. Specifically, unfettered associational waiver discrimination facilitated by the state-action of credible communication might unduly burden an individual’s Second Amendment rights. We therefore propose banning economic associational discrimination based on whether or not a person has waived – except for explicitly pre-defined individuals who have plausible self-defense interests in refusing to associate with someone who hasn’t waived.

The remainder of this article is divided into four Parts. Part I describes the details of the proposal. This Part will describe how an Internet platform might verify the identity and secure the assent of waiving individuals as well as discuss different ways of structuring choice. We will also detail the variations found to date in the five different state bills proposing waiver registries. The history of this drafting process supports the notion that this laboratory of democracy is a place of remarkable invention – as lawmakers, like Washington Senator Jamie Pedersen, conjured new implementations that had not occurred to us (or other academics across several seminars).

Part II presents the theoretical case for why people might willingly volunteer to waive their rights to bear arms and provides the results of two different surveys estimating the potential demand for waiver. Part III then considers constitutional and policy concerns raised by our proposal – including, inter alia, whether and when a laissez-faire associational marketplace would unconstitutionally burden Second Amendment rights, and whether private associational choices even trigger Second Amendment analysis. Part IV discusses implementation of our proposal using states’ existing option of adding “No Guns” registrants as an additional “state prohibitor” category to the NICS list.20

Our registry gives new meaning to the term “self-defense”: instead of thinking solely of how we can best protect ourselves from others, our proposal gives individuals a new way to be protected from themselves. The registry thus facilitates what Heller identified as the “core” and “central component” undergirding an individual’s Second Amendment right by allowing individuals to be better in charge of their self-defense choices.21

20 Although this Article is centrally about giving individuals the ability to create in personam gun-free commitments, in the on-line Appendix we also consider the possibility of creating an analogous in rem registry that would give land owners the ability to create gun-free zones. Just as land conservancies allow owners to durably dedicate particular parcels to environmental uses, a “no guns” covenantal registry could make criminal firearm possession within the boundaries of registered land for both current and future owners.

21 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (identifying “self-defense” as the “the core lawful purpose” of gun possession); id. at 599 (“central component”).
I. Scope

While the idea of a waiver option as a liberty-enhancing device is readily understandable, important questions remain concerning the scope and specific means of how a waiver option would be implemented. This part describes and defends the structure of the “No Guns Registry” model statute that we have drafted and included in the Appendix. However, as we will see, the process of collaborating with state legislators who have introduced this idea in bills in five different states has led to important variation with regard to the speed of rescission’s effectiveness, the duties of mental health professions to refer patients to the registry and limitations on the email option. This experience underscores both that reasonable people can differ as to logistics and that state legislatures as laboratories of democracy remain substantial sites of innovation.\textsuperscript{22}

A. Registration Access and Informational Prerequisites

To begin, it would be essential for waiver procedures to attend to three different informational prerequisites. The registry platform should credibly (i) verify the identity of the person waiving, (ii) prevent unauthorized disclosures, and (iii) inform the individual of the legal effects of waiver.

Verifying the identity of the person waiving is essential to preclude a kind of identity theft where imposters maliciously waive another person’s Second Amendment rights. Credible on-line verification systems already exist in a variety of other circumstances. For example, the IRS has a mechanism for verifying an individual’s identity as a prerequisite for receiving an “Identity Protection Personal Identification Number” that is needed to electronically file tax returns. The IRS verification process requires individuals to respond to a confirmation email, and to supply their Social Security number, date of birth, filing status, and the mailing address from their most recently filed tax return. In addition, the platform requires individuals to answer personal, financial, and tax related questions to confirm identity.\textsuperscript{23} In contrast, the Social Security Administration’s on-line mechanism for verifying identity as a prerequisite for receiving a full benefits statement only requires providing a valid email address, a Social Security number, and a U.S. mailing address.\textsuperscript{24} In both settings, the prospect of ex post criminal punishment does some of the work in deterring “spoofing” ex ante.

Washington’s implementation of the registry verifies user identity by requiring registrants to file “a voluntary waiver of firearm rights with the clerk of the court in any county” and requires that the clerk “must request photo identification to verify the person’s identity prior to accepting

\textsuperscript{22} See Andrew Karch, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (2007).
\textsuperscript{23} For example, one of us was asked to answer the multiple choice questions “Which of the following was the property tax amount for [home residence] for the 2000 tax year?” and “When did you SELL the property at [investment property]?”
\textsuperscript{24} U.S. Social Security Administration, Sign In or Create an Account, https://secure.ssa.gov/RIL/SiView.do?val=AE\textsubscript{2} [visited 8/2/2016]
the form.”\(^\text{25}\) While offline verifications, including the possibility of requiring notarized forms,\(^\text{26}\) may reduce the risk of registration identity theft, the likely cost in participation is too great to make this the exclusive means of registration.

The second information requisite concerns data security. It is important that the waiver platform be adequately secured from cyber-attacks and other unauthorized disclosures of information. Without adequate assurance of such security, some individuals will forego registering for fear that their lack of firearm protection will become publicly known – making them targets of crime. While we have become inured to stories of mass disclosure of private information from both government and non-government databases,\(^\text{27}\) security protocols and encryption algorithms have been successfully developed to reduce the risk of mass publication of the registry.\(^\text{28}\) The existing NICS already takes “extensive measures” to ensure the security of system information.\(^\text{29}\) To ensure that the NICS is not to be used to establish a federal registry of those who have purchased a firearm, all information about inquiries resulting in an allowed transfer are destroyed prior to the start of the next NICS operational day.\(^\text{30}\) Moreover, under NICS regulations, gun dealers (“Federal Firearms Licensees”) are only authorized to query the system for the sole purpose of determining whether the firearm transfer is allowed, and are prohibited from disclosing that information to others.\(^\text{31}\)

Third and finally, it is essential that any system securing waiver consent adequately inform the individual of the legal consequences of such waiver. Before signing, individuals should be made aware, not only that waiver will bar them from possessing or purchasing firearms, but also:

- the definition of “constructive possession,”
- the potential criminal penalties for possessing or attempting to purchase,
- the ability of police to query the NICS as part of their enforcement efforts.\(^\text{32}\)

---


\(^{26}\) Offline notarization was the original proposal. Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1465 (2015).

\(^{27}\) See Ian Ayres, Contracting for Privacy Precaution (and a Laffer Curve for Crime), J. LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2017) (providing examples).


\(^{29}\) F.B.I., NICS Fact Sheet, [visited 8/2/2016]


\(^{31}\) F.B.I., NICS FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEE MANUAL (2011). [downloaded 7/27/16]

\(^{32}\) See 28 C.F.R. § 25.6:

(1) Providing information to Federal, state, tribal, or local criminal justice agencies in connection with the issuance of a firearm-related or explosives-related permit or license, including permits or licenses to possess, acquire, or transfer a firearm, or to carry a concealed firearm, or to import, manufacture, deal in, or purchase explosives;
the automatic 21-day waiting period for subsequently rescinding waiver,

the potential legal and non-legal consequences of providing email addresses to the platform – detailing the purposes to which addressees can and cannot legally use information related to your waiver.

To assure that such disclosure is effective, government should undertake ongoing tests of the registry’s users. Just as ad-substantiation helps to assure that advertisements don’t leave potential consumers with false impressions,33 “consequence substantiation” could help assure that the registry doesn’t leave registrants with a false impression of legal effect of waiver. The platform might provide specialized warnings about unexpected adverse consequences.34 One might even imagine forcing registrants to pass a test establishing requisite knowledge of the possible consequences of waiver before allowing a registration to become effective.35

While not a formal informational prerequisite, enlightened policymaking should also be attuned to informing both the general public and at risk subpopulations about the waiver option. Massachusetts has led the nation here and helped us see the value of requiring acute-care hospitals and satellite emergency facilities to provide individuals reasonably believed to be suffering with depression with the opportunity to register.36 The Commonwealth bill would also require state-funded suicide hotlines to inform callers about the registration option.37 We have incorporated these provisions into our model statute38 and required that Department of Motor Vehicles provide the registration option (just as DMVs have become focal points for organ donation and voter registration and other dimensions of citizen choice).39

(2) Responding to an inquiry from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives in connection with a civil or criminal law enforcement activity relating to the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. Chapter 44) or the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. Chapter 53); or,

(3) Disposing of firearms in the possession of a Federal, state, tribal, or local criminal justice agency.


34 See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 25 (proposing “term substantiation” and warnings for unexpectedly adverse contractual terms).


36 H. 3611 §2, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017) (“Chapter 111 of the General Law is hereby amended by adding the following section: Section 237. A person voluntarily presenting in an acute-care hospital or a satellite emergency facility who is reasonably believed by the treating clinician to be suffering from a diagnosis of depression, using standardized definition of such diagnosis as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as published by the American Psychiatric Association, shall be presented with the form provided for in section 167A of chapter 6.”).

37 H. 3611 §5, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017) (“Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, any suicide hotline maintained or operated by any entity funded in whole or part by the commonwealth shall refer callers to the form provided for in section 1 of this act.”).

38 The California bill includes nearly identical language but describes the health provider referrals as a “best practice.” A.B. 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018).

39 See Appendix Model Act at Section 7; see also Hayley Cotter, Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: Mandated Choice, Individual Autonomy and Informed Consent, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 599, 614 (2011) (noting that the DMV is currently the main venue in which organ donation decisions are registered).
B. Choice Architecture

In addition to assuring the information integrity of the platform, it is necessary in designing the platform to decide what kinds of options to provide to individuals. Conceptually, a registration system could provide a dizzying array of choices concerning the types of firearm rights that are being waived, the durability of such waiver, and even whether such waiver is conditioned on the waiver choices of others. As a general matter, we have opted for reducing the number of choices – for example, by providing an all-or-nothing choice to waive purchase and possession rights instead of giving individuals the additional option to waive just the right to purchase. We favor this “numerus clausus” approach for standard “Paradox of Choice” reasons and because we speculate that allowing more limited options will increase the salience and social meaning of registering. But reasonable people can disagree not only on how many choices to offer, but on which particular choices should be included in the choice menu. In this section, we explore some of these choices and describe our reasons for crafting the choice architecture of our preferred platform (also reflect in the model state statute included in the Appendix).

Qualifications. Our model statute would “allow any person residing in the United States” to register on state’s registry. While a state might alternatively restrict registration to its residents, opening registration to out-of-state residents would allow such residents to commit not to purchase or possess in that state and all other states with similar registry laws. Such a commitment might be valuable for non-residents who regularly vacation in the registry state. In what we view as perhaps the worst example of state innovation, Massachusetts’ bill requires individuals in registering to acknowledge that they have “a psychiatric disability and are a danger to themselves.” This acknowledgment unreasonably discriminates against citizens who do not fit

40 Since the no guns waiver is a kind of commitment device (making it harder for a waiving individual’s future to purchase or possess firearms), it should be surprising that the choice architecture decisions discussed in this section are analogous to many of the choices confronted in the commitment contracting platform, stickK.com (cofounded by one of us). Just as with stickK contracts, the platform had to confront questions concerning the scope of the commitment, the consequences of breaking the commitment, as well as identify the person who will decide whether the commitment has been achieved, and who will be notified of the commitments success or failure. See Ayres, supra note 9.

41 For example, one might allow registrants to choose whether they want to waive their rights to long firearms as well as handguns or whether they wish to waive their rights to concealed as well as open carry or whether they wish to retain the right to rent and use firearms at shooting ranges. While it might seem that shooting ranges could be exempted without risking loss of life, ranges have, as an empirical matter, been a site of many suicides. See Mark Feldmann, Officials Struggle with Spate of Suicides at Shooting Range, The Journal-Times (Wisconsin) (May 27, 2016), http://journaltimes.com/news/local/officials-struggle-with-spate-of-suicides-at-shooting-range/article_73b1bce4-a8fc-527a-994e-17a51852fcej1.html (reporting that five people at one gun range killed themselves with rented guns between 2009 and 2016). [visited June 6, 2016]

42 Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Subgroup Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms (unpublished manuscript).


44 See infra at text accompanying note 158.

within these qualifying categories. Moreover, it would needlessly stigmatize registrants and depress registration without any credible offsetting benefit. We certainly don’t mean to suggest that this was the intent of the drafters of the Massachusetts bill. To the contrary, the Massachusetts bill was drafted in response to a horrible tragedy involving both mental illness and extreme suicide risk.

**Purchase and Possession.** We propose giving individuals the all-or-nothing choice to waive their rights to both purchase and possess firearms. There is a plausible case for limiting the scope of waiver to just purchases. Waiving the rights of people to possess as well as purchase guns may deter some people from waiving, and it may be difficult for police to effectively enforce waiver of the right to possess. To date none of the state registration bills has include waiving the right to possess as part of registration. Moreover, only the Tennessee and California bills explicitly integrate their registries with the NICS database. The other states which operate independent background check databases would incapacitate registrants from purchasing by integrating the registry with their state specific background check database. Integrating the state registries with NICS is important, however, because integration would stop registrants from being able to purchase firearms from any gun dealer in the country.

Notwithstanding the failure of states as of yet to adopt our broader waiver proposal, there remains a strong policy argument for including possession rights in the waiver decision. Waiving the right to purchase will not by itself produce a safer environment for registrants who already have access to firearms. And waiving the right to possess might give registrants additional ability to bargain with love ones for reduced access to firearms in their shared homes. Moreover, as discussed below, our experimental survey found no statistical difference in willingness to waive “purchase and possession” rights versus just “purchase” rights. So at least in this initial experiment, there was no reduction in willingness to waive when no possession is included in the waiver provisions.

These arguments strongly support allowing individuals to restrict both their purchase and possession rights. Whether to also provide individuals with a second, purchase-only option is a close question. Providing such an option would reduce the benefits of a possession ban listed above. A purchase-only ban would allow greater access to firearms among individuals who don’t trust themselves with guns. Taking instead an ex post perspective, however, preventing

46 Our model statutes include within the meaning of purchase even gratuitous transfers of firearms to waiving individuals.
47 *Vars, supra* note 5, at 1469 n.31.
48 If state law enforcement found someone in possession of a firearm and suspected they might be barred under our model statute (or other law), they could report that to ATF. ATF could then inquire whether the person was in NICS. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(j)(2). Possession might not be illegal under federal law, but transfer to that individual by a licensed dealer (or other person, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)) would violate federal law, thus providing adequate foundation for the ATF inquiry.
49 See, e.g., AB 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018).
51 See infra text accompanying note 156 (discussing nationwide effect of registrants as “state prohibitors”).
individuals from restricting purchase and not possession could also lead to bad results. If people at high risk of suicide are subject to a possession ban and violate it, they could end up in prison when they really belong in treatment.52

To facilitate the ability of people who currently possess firearms and want to waive the right to purchase and possess, a state might mandate that its police departments offer to take possession of the firearms for periods of registration (and lay out safe harbors for transferring possession to third-parties, such as gun dealers, for storage).53 A more aggressive policy might require registrants as part of registering to grant police permission to search their belongings and confiscate any firearms.54 But such a provision would likely deter many people from registering and accordingly is contraindicated.

Rescission. We also propose that individuals who waive be given the option to rescind their waiver with the rescission automatically taking effect twenty-one days later.55 Reasonable arguments might be made for making waiver more durable. For example, the Wisconsin waiver bill makes waiver non-rescindable for the first-year after registration.56 Alternatively, a more durable commitment might be accomplished by requiring some other authority to approve before rescission takes effect. For example, the California registry bill requires a court, before ordering rescission to find “by a preponderance of the evidence that [the registrant] is not at elevated risk of suicide.”57 To our minds, California would be better served if it emulated the existing criteria for “relief from disability” programs found in the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007.58 That act makes a state eligible for federal grants if the state has created a mechanism whereby people who have been involuntarily placed on the NICS registry for being “formally adjudicated as…mental defective[s], or committed involuntarily to a mental institution” can seek relief from the status and have their names removed from the list.59 To qualify for removal, the individual

53 Police departments perform an analogous function when they take temporary possession of weapons when acting pursuant to a Gun Violence Restraining Order. See infra at 74.
54 Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Stop, Thief! FORBES (Jan. 10, 2005) (discussing a Combat Auto Theft bumper sticker that grants police permission to stop the vehicle if found being driven between 1 am and 5 am).
55 Compare Vars, supra note 5, at 1469 (proposing 7-day delay period); Selvaggio & Vars, supra note 5, at 673 (“A one-week delay, however, would not be enough to prevent all gun suicide attempts.”); see also id. (arguing that more stringent judicial hearing option is constitutional).
56 Amb. Bill 579 (Wisc. 2017). The bill also gives the would-be registrant the tripartite choice of waiving for one, five, or twenty years. Id. As previously stated, we think consumers are more likely to register with a simpler choice (of ongoing registration until opting to rescind).
57 A.B. 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018) (“A person registered on the California Do Not Sell List may subsequently file a petition in the Superior Court of the county in which the person resides requesting to have his or her name removed from the registry. The court, after a hearing, shall order removal of the person’s name from the registry if he or she establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is not at elevated risk of suicide.”)
59 Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Certification of Qualifying State Relief from Disability Program, https://www.atf.gov/file/11731/download, [downloaded 8/2/2016] See also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (defining terms “formally adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed involuntarily to a mental institution”).
must be found not “likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety,” and “granting relief will not be contrary to the public interest.”\textsuperscript{60} The Massachusetts registry bill adopts these criteria.\textsuperscript{61}

The Wisconsin registry, in contrast, makes mental health professionals the gatekeepers with regard to registrant rescission. After Wisconsin’s year-long irrevocable period, registrants may remove themselves from the database by submitting to the department of justice a request for removal and an affidavit from a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist saying that individual would not pose a threat to themselves or others should they possess a firearm.\textsuperscript{62}

More durable waivers that can only be removed after third-party (judicial or psychiatric) assessment may be inimical to gun safety by dissuading some individuals from waiving their gun rights in the first instance. Our own survey evidence supports this possibility. As reported below, subjects who were given the option of rescinding with an automatic 7-day waiting period were 6.7 percentage points more likely to waive than subjects who were given the option of rescinding only if they could convince a state judge that they were not a risk to themselves or others. Moreover, we find below that subjects who had previously been diagnosed with mental health issues were particularly less likely to waive when only given the option of judicial rescission. Therefore, a subgroup that may be more at risk is more unwilling to initially waive when faced with the potential prospect of later establishing their mental capacity. Just delaying the reacquisition of gun rights may prevent some suicides. Many gun suicides are impulsive decisions completed with only a few minutes or hours of thought.\textsuperscript{63} Studies of have estimated that mandatory waiting periods have reduced suicide rates by as much as 6 percent.\textsuperscript{64} A substantial percentage of registrants who rescind their waiver because they wish to kill themselves accordingly are likely not to sustain this desire over an enforced waiting period. Accordingly, we have opted here for a less durable, but more transparently reversible rescission standard of merely waiting 21 days to maximize the chance of securing initial waiver. The Tennessee registry bill has adopted this 3-week approach, while the Washington bill mandates only 1-week before revocation becomes effective.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{60} Bureau of Justice Statistics, The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=49 (“As of September 2015, twenty-nine states have enacted relief programs that have been certified by the state and approved by ATF.”). [visited 8/2/2016] See also Simpson JR, Sharma KK: Firearms and the mentally Ill: Demographics and Psychiatric Characteristics of Individuals Petitioning for Early Relief from Firearms Prohibition, Presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (February 23, 2007).

\textsuperscript{61} H. 3611 §3, 190th Sess. (Mass. 2017) & MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 § 36C.


\textsuperscript{63} Linda G. Peterson et al., Self-inflicted Gunshot Wounds: Lethality of Method Versus Intent, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 228, 228-31 (1985) (finding that among thirty survivors of firearm suicide attempts more than half had suicidal thoughts for less than a day); Megan Spokas et al., Characteristics of Individuals Who Make Impulsive Suicide Attempts, 136 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1121, 1123 (2012) (finding that only 36.1% of people contemplated suicide for three or more hours before an attempt).


The diversity of approaches seen across the five registry bills regarding waiver durability provides an encouraging example of federalism in action. The differing choices of registry bills largely fall within the realm of plausibility as legislators tradeoff the *ex ante* concern of registration incentives with the *ex post* concern of (re)arming at-risk individuals. These variations are the experiments emanating from the laboratory of democracy that may, if passed, ultimately provide evidence to guide future registry design.

Our model statute also provides registrants the option of immediately having their names removed from the NICS list if they can persuade a judge that they are not a risk to themselves or others. This additional option for immediate judicial bypass would protect registrants whose circumstances change and might, for example, need a gun for self-defense. We also provide registrants an affirmative defense against prosecution for purchase or possession if the individual demonstrates necessity or self-defense. These interventions would maintain the basic durability of waiting period while easing concerns that might prevent some from registering and allowing registrants to protect themselves from later-arising threats.

**Credible Communication.** We propose that individuals who waive also be given the option to credibly communicate their waiver to others. Accordingly, our model statute calls for the registration platform to give waiving individuals the option of providing email addresses that the platform will automatically notify of the individual’s waiver. Without this email option, waiving individuals could exercise their free-speech rights by directly telling a third-party that they had waived their right to purchase and possess guns, but the third-party would have trouble verifying whether such waiver had actually taken place. With or without the registry option, individuals are free to contractually promise not to purchase or possess firearms. But the possibility of contract damages would often be an imperfect substitute for an email from the registry confirming that gun dealers are incapacitated from selling to the registrant and that the registrant has subjected herself to potential criminal penalties for purchase or possession.\(^66\) While any individual may claim (and even promise) to have waived, email notifications from the government platform will more credibly indicate that committed not to bear arms.

This communication option should be updatable across time in two ways. First, if a waiving individual later rescinds her waiver, the platform should automatically and immediately send emails to all previously designated addresses indicating that such waiver is being rescinded in twenty-one days. Notice of rescission will give recipients notice that the individual will soon regain the right to bear arms and thus give recipients who were relying on the previous waiver the ability to make different associational choices regarding the rescinding individual. Notice of rescission would give recipients a chance to contact the individual and perhaps prevent a suicide attempt or other tragic outcome. This notice of rescission might be particularly valuable for health-

care professionals who, especially with regard to patients who had previously engaged in suicidal ideation, might inquire into the patient’s current mental health status.67

Second, the platform should allow waiving individuals to log on subsequent to their initial waiver and provide additional email addresses to the platform. The platform would immediately notify these additional addressees that the individual had waived her right to bear arms (and also notify these addressees if that individual subsequently initiated the process of rescinding her waiver). The platform would not, however, allow an individual to log on and remove the name of an addressee because such removal would undermine giving addressees notice of possible subsequent rescission.

Part III below will defend the idea that email notifications from government can constitutionally facilitate an associational marketplace in which economic actors with plausible self-defense interests might refuse to deal with non-registrants. Specifically, we imagine that landlords, fellow residents and insurers might condition their willingness to economically associate on receiving registry-confirming emails.68 And as just mentioned, registrants might willingly provide the registry with the email addresses of their psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals to enhance the ability of these professionals to provide ongoing care.69

But as a political matter, the email option has been controversial. One person’s informed association can be another person’s coercive discrimination. Several of the registry bills to date forgo the email option altogether, and outlaw any attempts to discriminate on registry status in contracting.70 However, Washington Senator Jamie Pedersen creatively forged an alternative email option which eliminates the possibility of waiver discrimination while retaining some of the core public health benefits. Pedersen’s registry bill allows registrants to designate a third-party

---

67 Email addressees should also be notified should a registrant attempt to purchase a firearm or be found with unauthorized possession of a firearm. Like rescission, an unauthorized attempt to purchase or possess is an event which might trigger addressees to make different associational choices or to inquire into the state of the registrant’s health.68 We also propose that email recipients be prohibited from sharing an individual’s waiver status with others unless the addressse receives separate non-platform authorization from the waiving individual to share that information. But unlike the mandatory duty of confidentiality imposed on gun dealers, see supra note 19, it is important that the duty of confidentiality be merely a default, because we want to create an option for citizens who so choose to make their waiver public. But to so choose a waiving individual would need to (i) register for the “No Guns” list, (ii) provide the email address of a third-party, and (iii) separately authorize that third-party to publicly disclose that waiver information. While cumbersome, we propose this pathway to publicity out of an abundance of concern over waiver privacy.

69 Mental health professionals can play a crucial role in such interventions because a substantial proportion of people who commit suicide have previously been under the care of a mental health professional. Jason B. Luoma, et al., Contact With Mental Health And Primary Care Providers Before Suicide: A Review of the Evidence, 159 Am. J. Psych. 909, 911 (2002) (“As many as half of suicide victims during their lifetimes had contact with a mental health professional.”). But of course this means that roughly half have not been under the care of a mental health professional. See infra Swanson et al, note 75, at 23.

contact to be notified “if a voluntary waiver of firearm rights is revoked.” The more-recently introduced California bill analogously allows registrants to “list up to five electronic mail addresses with the registry to be contacted promptly if the person subsequently requests that his or her name be removed from the registry.” By restricting registry notifications to the “back end” moment of potential rescission, the Washington and California bills preclude economic and non-economic actors from conditioning their association on the registry verifying that a waiver is in effect. A Washington landlord might only want to rent to tenants who have registered to waive their firearm rights, but in Washington the landlord will only learn if a registrant attempts to rescind her registration. “Back-end” notifications are still valuable because they can provide friends, family and health-care professionals with notice that this person was once registered and will soon be capable of again purchasing firearms. Recipients of these back-end notifications have the opportunity to inquire and potentially intervene to save the registrant’s life.

Back-end notifications do not achieve all the benefits of our more fulsome email notification proposal. Front-end notifications sent at the time of initial registration are liberty enhancing options which foster not only informed association, but allow others to better protect themselves. Reasonable citizens might, for example, prefer playdates for their children at homes with “no guns” registrants and allow healthcare professionals to ensure that at-risk patients have taken action to reduce their access to firearms. Interim notifications that a registrant has attempted illegally to purchase a firearm, like back-end revocation notices, alert recipients that the registrant may be at risk.

Nonetheless, we take the Washington bill’s use of back-end notice to be a humbling example of legislative creativity. After thinking and writing for years about alternative implementations of our self-exclusion idea, we had never considered the possibility of using an email option exclusively for back-end revocations. The ability of Senator Pedersen to devise a plausible improvement that had never occurred to us (or been mentioned at seminars on this article given at over a dozen universities) is a success story for federalism. Creative state legislators confronting the necessity of forging a political feasible coalition have conjured not just different forms of email notification, but different forms of durability, and revocation. The state laboratory has succeeding in drafting different experiments far beyond our expectation.

**Third-party Waivers.** It might seem obvious that the default meaning of an individual’s inaction in any waiver scheme should be that the individual retains her full Second Amendment rights. But here we consider two situations where third-parties might be empowered to waive the Second Amendment rights of certain classes of individuals – effectively, changing the individual’s default legal treatment to waiver (with the possibility of rescission 21 days after an affected individual moves to rescind his or her waiver). First, we might imagine a regime in which the

---

72 AB 1927 § 1 (Cal. 2018).
parents of a minor would be empowered to waive on their child’s behalf. From the child’s perspective, such a parent-initiated waiver would effectively change the default. The child upon turning 18 would have to affirmatively ask that the parents’ waiver be rescinded and wait an additional 21 days before being able purchase a gun. Parental waiver would thus change the minimum age of purchasing a gun from 18 years to 18 years and 21 days. But the inertia created by the changed default (and the 21-day delay only starting after an affirmative request to rescind) might still be sufficient, given the impulsive nature of many suicides, to prevent some gun fatalities.

Second, we can also imagine a regime that empowered the police or other state officials to change the default status of some individuals who have displayed erratic behavior that falls short of necessitating involuntary commitment, but which creates probable cause for the official to believe that the individual is not well suited to purchase or possess firearms. For example, responding to a harassment call at a hotel, police documented Aaron Alexis’s paranoid delusions, but did not arrest him or initiate involuntary commitment proceedings. Less than six weeks later, Alexis legally purchased a shotgun and used it to kill twelve people at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. Again this third-party waiver would only act as a changed default, because the affected individual would be free to immediately seek to rescind the waiver and regain full Second Amendment rights after 21 days. We envision a system where the public official could, after an appropriate finding, place the affected individual on the “No Guns” registry and have the state notified if the affected individual later moves to rescind the waiver. So the government would learn of the individual’s attempt to acquire weapons and have 21 days to investigate whether there would be an independent basis for further action, such as potentially moving to have the person involuntarily committed, and thereby establish a basis for keeping the person on the NICS list notwithstanding his or her registry rescission. As analogous Gun Violence Restraining Orders

---

73 This is similar to, though of course not the same as, giving a newborn infant a lifetime NRA membership. One of us has a relative who did exactly that.
74 Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2014).
75 Id.
76 This proposal has precedent. Under Indiana law, a police officer may seize firearms from an individual if the police officer believes that person is “dangerous.” Ind. Code § 35-47-14-3. Similarly, one of us has argued that people experiencing psychotic symptoms should lose their gun rights. Vars, supra note 42.
77 In contrast, parents of individuals who have gained the age of majority should not by default be given notice of any attempt by their child to rescind parental waiver.
(GVROs) gain legislative traction in many states, this kind of third-party waiver might prove to be not only effective but also politically palatable.

While we are attracted to these two classes of third-party waivers – especially because they only amount to imposing a fairly short waiting period on an affected individual’s right to acquire or own firearms – we have resisted the temptation to deviate from libertarian impulse animating our proposal more generally. Since legislators might constitutionally impose a waiting period on all gun purchases, it is likely that empowering parents and state officials to impose waiting periods on subsets of individuals is likely to pass constitutional muster. Subsequent legislatures might ultimately embrace third-party waiver, but we have opted for a more conservative, freedom-preserving position.

II. WHO WOULD WAIVE

A. Theory

Giving citizens the option to waive their Second Amendment rights and to communicate their waiver as a theoretical matter expands personal freedom. Private contracting and promise do not allow individuals to as credibly commit to non-ownership or to communicate that status to others. An individual could contractually promise not to purchase or possess guns, but that

78 GVRO statutes allows 3rd parties (including state officials) with documented evidence that another person poses a serious threat to himself or herself or others to petition a court for an order temporarily suspending the respondent’s possession of a firearm or ammunition. See, e.g., Jack Linshi, California Law Allows Family Members to Remove Relative’s Guns for Safety, TIME (Sept. 30, 2014), http://time.com/3450797/california-gun-violence-restraining-order-law; see also Dan Friedman, The Gun Law Saving Lives in Connecticut, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/new-gun-violence-bills/499199 (mentioning ten states expected to consider GVRO legislation in 2017). Our registry proposal can be seen as allowing a kind of GVRO self-petition – so that individuals could automatically obtain gun violence restraining order (GVRO) to limit their own ability to purchase or possess firearms by filing a petition (i.e. registering) via the internet platform. An advantage of adding self-petition to existing GVRO legislation is that GVROs often empower police to aid the restricted individuals in dispossessing themselves of firearms. Id.

79 Allowing third-parties (including police and other state actors) to petition or negotiate for self-exclusion of individuals who pose an imminent risk of injuring themselves or others can respond to the problem of individuals who are not under the care of mental health professionals and accordingly have reduced opportunity of involuntary commitment:

An estimated 9 percent of adults in the U.S. have problems with impulsive, angry behavior and have access to firearms at home; these are individuals who admit that they “break and smash things” when they get angry, and many of them would meet diagnostic criteria for a mental health problem such as a personality disorder. However, less than 10 percent of these angry, impulsive, gun-possessing adults have ever been hospitalized for a mental health problem, and thus would never have lost their gun rights by dint of a mental-health-based restriction.


80 Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016).

81 We would however allow government to negotiate for waiver as part of a plea bargain with regard to crimes that by themselves would not qualify the individual to be added to the registry (and government could revoke parole if the individual who accepted the deal later attempted to rescind their waiver).
promise would not subject gun dealers to liability for selling the individual a gun. While breaching the promise would subject the promising individual to potential contractual damages, it would not subject the promisor to criminal liability. Accordingly, learning that an individual had entered into a binding contract not to purchase or possess firearms would not provide as much certainty as an email from a government-sponsored registry that the person in question had opted into potential criminal liability. This is not to say that the waiver registry would be perfectly enforced, it is only to say that the registry option would increase the choice set of Americans and hence expand their liberty.

There are many ways, however, that government might as a formal matter expand our liberty. They might, for example, give us the freedom to subject ourselves to criminal prosecution if we ever uttered the nonsense sentence “An iron exposes her imagined customer.” But this technical expansion of our liberty would have no practical value, because we cannot imagine why a person would ever want to exercise this type of liberty.

The burden of this section, then, is to explain why the “No Guns” registry has practical value; that is, why reasonable people would want to exercise the option to waive their right to bear arms. (And the next section will provide empirical support from surveys that substantial numbers of Americans are in fact willing to waive this right.) As mentioned in the introduction, the demand for waiver can be divided into three different components: (1) self-exclusion, (2) negotiated-exclusion, and (3) political expression.

First and foremost, the waiver right can be seen as a commitment device for those who rationally want to limit their future selves from misusing guns. People who worry about loss of future control seek out a variety of disabling devices – including bariatric surgery (which makes it painful to overeat) and Antabuse (which makes it painful to drink alcohol). Users of the commitment website, stickK.com, have voluntarily put more than $35,000,000 at risk to increase the chance that their future selves follow through with contractually set goals. States can and have played important roles in providing citizens with commitment options. Several states have well developed “no gambling” registries that block those who register from using state casinos, and

---

82 A rare, possible exception would be if a prosecutor could prove beyond reasonable doubt that the promisor at the time of promising intended not to keep the promise. See Ian Ayres & Greg Klass, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005).  
83 See F.A. Hayek, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) (explaining that the reason for constitutions “is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt--or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound--to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them.”)  
84 Ayres, supra note 5, at 143. One might imagine opening other government registries to voluntary. For example, someone who felt they were at risk for committing sexual offenses might voluntarily add their names to sex offender registries. While the stigma of current public registries suggests that few would volunteer for such registration, one might imagine that some people would volunteer for government GPS monitoring to credibly establish alibis against false claims.
state recognition of marriage can be seen as enhancing individual liberty by facilitating the ability of people to make more durable relationship commitments.

Commitment devices are useful to people who have limited amounts of willpower or self-control and are sufficiently self-aware to understand that they have a problem.\(^{85}\) It is not our claim that everyone who rationally should want to waive their right to bear arms would in fact avail themselves of a “No Guns” registry. But of the hundreds of thousands of people in the United States who suffer from mental health illnesses, tens of thousands may understand during moments of clarity that their future selves are at risk of misusing firearms and be willing to take a government-sponsored opportunity to limit their future, depressed or even psychotic, selves. The next section will present survey evidence that such waiver demand is more pronounced among people who have been previously diagnosed with mental illness.

A second category of waiver demand can come from what we term “negotiated exclusion.” Individuals may rationally commit to waive their Second Amendment firearm rights in order to induce others to associate with them. In particular, negotiated exclusion is made possible by the ability to credibly communicate one’s waiver. Some friends, neighbors, and even loved ones may be more willing to associate with individuals who credibly signal that they have foregone the right to bear arms. The potential demand for negotiated exclusion is suggested by analysis of Connecticut’s Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GVROs) where roughly half of the petitions for gun removal come from family and friends.\(^{86}\) Individuals who by themselves would not be willing to self-exclude from gun ownership may voluntarily opt to waive their firearm rights in order to secure or to continue particular associational opportunities.

Our proposed registry enhances both self-commitment liberty (by letting individuals bind their future selves) and market liberty (by letting individuals better make commitments to others). Our proposal creates a marketplace of informed association where one person’s right to bear arms has potentially to contend with other people’s right to not associate. The “No Guns” registry thus creates opportunities for a modern-day version of the central plot device in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata — where some individuals are motivated to yield their right to weapons because of threatened withholding of various forms of interactions by friends and family.\(^{87}\) In September 2006, dozens of women organized a sex strike in Pereira, Colombia, called La Huelga de las Piernas Cruzadas ("the strike of crossed legs") in an attempted effort to encourage gang members to turn in their weapons.\(^{88}\) We are skeptical that mass refusals of this kind could be effectively

\(^{85}\) Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 A.M. Econ. Rev. 103 (1999) (distinguishing “naifs” and “sophisticates” based on whether they self-aware of their self-control deficits).

\(^{86}\) Rachel Sereix, Study Shows Connecticut Temporary Gun Removal Law Lowers Suicide Risk, The Chronicle (Nov. 29, 2016) (49% of “gun removal cases were initially reported to the police by an acquaintance”).

\(^{87}\) ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (in which Lysistrata persuades the women of Greece to withhold sexual privileges from their husbands and lovers as a means of forcing the men to end the Peloponnesian War).

\(^{88}\) Colombian Gangsters Face Sex Ban, BBC News (Sept. 13, 2006) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5341574.stm, [visited 8/2/2016] See also Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement In Domestic And International Law,
organized. But friend and family demands to register as a prerequisite for playdates and family visits is not far fetched.

The demand for negotiated self-exclusion might also be prompted by the threat of economic entities to withhold various forms of residential association. Homeowners’ associations, coop boards and cotenants might condition occupancy upon individuals’ waiver of their gun rights. Landlords who at times attempt to collect late rent may prefer unarmed tenants.

Our proposed associational marketplace might even exhibit some aspects of a commodified marketplace. Some individuals might offer compensation if others will sign the registry. Or, a tenants’ association might mandate a financial forfeiture or eviction if a resident resists a required waiver. Life insurers or homeowners (or renter) insurers might give discounts to individuals who credibly signaled that they had ceded the right to bear arms. While many suicides are impulsive, there is also evidence that insureds are more likely to attempt suicide once the initial period of payout exclusion ends. Most states mandate that life insurance pay out when the cause of death is suicide if the death occurs after the first year or two of the policy.

Samuel Hsin-yu Tseng found that the “suicide rate quadruples after [this] exclusion period.” Life-insurance companies, given the opportunity, might offer discounts to insureds who had provided registry verification that they had waived their right to own arms. Similarly, competition might induce renter and homeowner insurance to offer discounts to waiving individuals as there is some evidence that gun ownership increase the probability of burglary.

Guns in the home may pose a threat to burglars, but also serve as an inducement, since guns are particularly valuable loot. Other things equal, a gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one where guns are more sparse. The new empirical results reported here provide no support for a net deterrent effect from

---

**Footnotes:**

89 These actors might be motivated by any of a number of interests, including but not limited to security concerns. See, e.g., Derrick Rose, Witness: Tenant Shot Landlord Through Window After Attempt to Collect Rent, WHAS 11 ABC (June 28, 2016), http://www.whas11.com/news/crime/witness-tenant-shot-landlord-through-window-after-attempt-to-collect-rent/258300179.

90 Such a private commitment contract could be created at the commitment contract website, co-founded by one of the authors, www.stickk.com.

91 Samuel Hsin-yu Tseng, The Effect of Life Insurance Policy Provisions on Suicide Rates (unpublished manuscript) (33 states “allow for a two-year suicide exclusion, Colorado and North Dakota allow for a one-year exclusion, but Missouri imposes a more stringent regulation, requiring that the insurer cannot use suicide to deny death benefit payments unless it can be shown that the insureds intend to commit suicide when they applied for the policies”).

92 Id. at 1. See also Joe Chen, Yun Jeong Choi & Yasuyuki Sawada, Suicide and Life Insurance (unpublished manuscript) (using OECD cross-country data from 1980 to 2002 finding analogous exemption period effects).

93 Cf. Steven Yaccino, Schools Seeking to Arm Employees Hit Hurdle on Insurance, NEW YORK TIMES A14 (July 7, 2013) (higher insurance premia deterred some from allowing permit holders to bring guns onto public school property).

widespread gun ownership. Rather, our analysis concludes that residential burglary rates tend to increase with community gun prevalence.\(^{95}\)

While the incentive of individual insurance companies to provide waiver discounts may be muted because reducing community gun prevalence lowers the payouts of its rivals, a similar “lowering rivals’ cost” effect has not stopped individual insurers from offering LoJack discounts.\(^{96}\)

This article’s notion of gun control is “libertarian” not only in that it gives the individual the enhanced rights to durably commit to not bear arms but also in that it gives others the liberty to condition their association on such waiver. Of course, facilitating an associational market could, as an analytic matter, lead to equilibrium with greater gun ownership. But the option to condition association on gun ownership already exists and is easily verified.\(^{97}\) The email verification option as mentioned above just levels the evidentiary playing field by allowing individuals to more feasibly condition association on another person’s waiver. Thus, while particular actors may or may not bring such pressure to bear,\(^{98}\) the email innovation on net should predictably lead toward less gun ownership.

The set of economic entities that might make waiver a prerequisite for contracting is potentially large and might cut across many different consumer and employment arenas. However, as described more in Part III, our proposal would only allow economic entities with residential or insurance self-defense interests to condition willingness to contract on waiver. Employers, for example, have a substantial interest in preventing their employees from bringing guns to the job site and killing themselves or others. There have been numerous instances of employee-instigated workplace violence, including the 2016 San Bernardino shootings, where an employee and his wife killed 14 others at a workplace holiday party.\(^{99}\) One federal investigator said the leading theory for motive was a “combination of terrorism and workplace” conflict.\(^{100}\) And while mass shootings in the workplace are unusual,\(^{101}\) attacks with fewer than four victims are quite common, resulting in 14,770 total workplace homicide victims between 1992 and 2012.\(^{102}\) But in an

\(^{95}\) Id. at 43.


\(^{97}\) See *Blocher, supra* note 5.

\(^{98}\) For example, if people with a higher risk of suicide are more likely to register, life insurers may not be economically motivated to give discounts for registering. But insurers would not be likely to increase the price to registrants because registrants would then not opt to disclose that information (via the registry email) to the insurer.


\(^{100}\) *Id.*


abundance of caution, we do not propose authorizing employers to discriminate on the basis of gun waiver.103

A third, and final, category of waiver demand might derive from what we term “political expression.” Some people might choose to both waive and credibly communicate their waiver to signal to fellow citizens and to representatives the registrants’ support of legislative action to limit gun violence. After a mass shooting, such as the 2016 Orlando attack at a gay nightclub in which 49 people were killed, many people experience a felt need to do something.104 While purchases of guns generally and assault rifles in particular tend to spike after mass shootings,105 other Americans might instead choose to take action to credibly signal that they are not armed. For example, when registering, an individual might simultaneously have the platform send evidence of their waiver to a “Stop Handgun Violence” organization.106

Of course, some people will be reluctant to have their identity as registrants publicly known for fear that they may become targets of home invasions and other crime, as criminals will be able to ascertain that they are not armed. However, even people who choose not to provide any email addresses might still be motivated to waive in order to signal their commitment to reducing firearm prevalence. This is because the platform would disclose the aggregate number of people who have volunteered to add their names to the registry. Indeed, this aggregate registry disclosure by category is already done – with the FBI reporting as of 2014 not just the total number of registrants (12,881,223) but the number of individuals prohibited from purchasing or possessing guns for particular reasons:

---

103 We also would prohibit government from purchasing waiver – for example, by requiring waiver as a prerequisite of a gun buyback program – because government purchasing might constitute and unconstitutional condition. Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988). However, as argued above, we would allow conditioning plea bargaining (with its independent requirement of wrong doing) upon waiver. See supra note 81.


106 See supra pp. 10-11 (describing mechanism of separately authorizing use of one’s name).
All that would be required under our proposal would be to add an additional category of “Voluntary Registrants.”

The “No Guns” list could thus become a particularly powerful way to publicly show support by signaling the number of people who are willing to waive their Second Amendment rights. The next section shows that close to a third of our survey respondents indicate that they would be willing to add their name to their state’s “No Gun” list. While some of these respondents are waiving as a self-exclusion/commitment strategy, others are likely waiving as a (small) way to take expressive action against gun violence.

B. Empiricism

This section goes beyond mere theorizing about potential demand and instead provides initial “proof of concept” evidence that a substantial minority of Americans are in fact willing to waive their Second Amendment rights. As an initial matter, most Americans do not currently own weapons. The exact percentage owning guns is difficult to ascertain, but surveys suggest that the

---

107 F.B.I., supra note 7, at 25. As described below, if implemented through our model state statute, “voluntary registrants” would be a subcategory of “state prohibitor,” the category created by disqualifying attributes defined by individual states. Our model statute would make people who had voluntarily registered an additional disqualifying category.
proportion may be as low as just one third and has been declining in recent decades. For example, Figure 1 shows that the proportion of people saying they had guns or revolvers in their home dropped from 49% in 1973 to just 34% in 2010:

Figure 1: U.S. Gun Ownership Percentage Over Time

Moreover, the proportion of Americans who personally own guns is, in this University of Chicago survey, just 22%. Accordingly, the registry is asking to citizens to waive a right that most are not exercising.

This section will be reporting survey results that more than 30 percent of respondents are willing to waive their gun rights. But this survey evidence is likely conservative for two reasons. First, the survey focuses primarily on the potential “self-exclusion” demand for waiver. Because the survey’s description of registration excluded the possibility of credible communication to third parties, we have not measured the derived demand of “negotiated exclusion” – where third-parties (friends, family, neighbors, co-tenants and insurers) may incentivize waiver by limiting their willingness to associate with non-waivers. Something as simple as a $50 annual discount for homeowners or life insurance might be sufficient to dramatically increase the demand for waiver. Second, the willingness-to-waive estimates are conservative because they were elicited without any prior government messaging. Public service announcements and other forms of advertisements might increase the salience of the question and the palatability of waiver itself. Of

109 Id.
110 Our empiricism, however, does not directly test how people would respond to our proposed 21-day waiting period, which as described above was chosen as a compromise between the less durable 7-day waiting period and the more durable state judge options that we test below. Note additionally that there is some evidence that there is often poor take up of advance directives, especially amongst people with mental illness. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychiatric Advance Directives and Reduction of Coercive Crisis Interventions, 17 J. MENTAL HEALTH 255, 259–63 (2008) (discussing a study in which 70% of individuals state that they wish to have an advanced directive but only 30% of individuals follow through); see also Eric B. Elbogen et al., Effectively Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives to Promote Self-Determination of Treatment Among People with Mental Illness, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 273, 286 (2007).
course, advertisements can also be utilized by those trying to discourage waiver. But our finding below that people are more willing to waive when informed that their peers are waiving is at least suggestive that more publicity and deliberation might produce on net even higher waiver rates than reported here.

C. MTurk Survey

1,050 Mechanical Turk respondents completed an online survey on a Thursday, March 3, 2016. The major caveat in using the MTurk worker population as survey respondents is its limited representativeness, raising questions about external validity. While restricted to the U.S., the MTurk worker population is not representative of Americans at large. Our sample is 63% male and is younger than average. 65% of the sample is between 18-34 years old, compared to 29% in the U.S. as a whole. The sample is more highly educated and more likely to be single. The sample is also much more liberal than the U.S. as a whole. Nearly 60% voted for Obama in 2012, while less than 20% voted for Romney, while in reality the voter split was 51% to 47%. 45% were registered Democrats and only 18% were registered Republicans. Nearly 80% were white, compared to 65% nationwide. We attempt to account for some of these disparities by estimating weighted averages that give heightened weight to the responses from relatively underrepresented respondent demographic groups.

Method. Respondents were randomized into eight groups defined by three pairs of treatments (2 x 2 x 2 = 8). The first treatment pair is “purchase” v. “possess or purchase,” referring to the banned activities for individuals whose names are on the list. Respondents assigned to the “possess or purchase” group were shown following vignette:

The National Instant Criminal Background Check System maintains a “No Guns” list which prevents certain individuals (for example, convicted felons) from possessing firearms and from purchasing firearms from gun dealers. Imagine that your state legislature has just enacted a new program that gives state residents the right to confidentially add their names to this “No Guns” list.” Proponents of the legislation have argued that restricting access to firearms reduces suicides, homicides, and accidental deaths.

---

111 See Online Appendix for details on the Mechanical Turk platform.
113 See Online Appendix Table 1.
114 See infra note 83.
Respondents assigned to the “purchase” group were shown a vignette that omits the “from possessing firearms” language, but is otherwise the same.

The second arm of the experiment randomly assigned respondents into “wait seven days” or “state judge” groups, referring to the manner in which an individual can remove their name from the list. The second pair of treatments states either:

“If you add your name, you can later remove it for any reason by requesting removal and waiting seven days” or
“If you add your name, you can later remove it if a state judge certifies that you are not a danger to yourself or others.”

The third arm of the experiment randomly assigned respondents into “simple ask” v. “more than half” groups, referring to the way respondents were asked about their willingness to register. The third pair of treatments states either:

“Would you be willing to add your name to your state’s ‘No Guns’ list?” or
“Would you be willing to add your name to your state’s ‘No Guns’ list if more than half of other adults in your state also add their names?”

A respondent was randomly assigned to each of the three arms, for a total of 8 (2 x 2 x 2) group combinations. A combination might be, for example, “purchase and possess,” “state judge” and “simple ask”.115

Results. The eight treatment groups were properly balanced on pre-treatment demographic characteristics – suggesting that the randomization successfully assigned similar respondents to the different groups.116 For our central outcome variable, we find across all vignette types that 30.8% (95% confidence interval: 28.0% to 33.6%) of our 1,050 MTurk subjects responded that they would be willing to add their names to their state’s “No Guns” list.117 Nearly a third of respondent expressed a willingness to waive some form of their Second Amendment rights.

The treatment effects for our three experimental arms can be seen in Figure 2:

115 See Online Appendix Exhibits 1-8 for screenshots of all 8 groups. The underlying data and statistical analysis (including STATA .do and output files) can be found at www.ianayres.com/nogunsdata.zip
116 See Online Appendix Table 2.
117 Using the Current Population Survey data, we apply post-stratification weights to the sample based on gender, age group, and region. After re-weighting the data to match the CPS data, the percent responding positively dropped slightly to 29.6% (95% confidence interval: 24.0% to 35.1%). There are several drawbacks to this methodology. First, we are forced to place very high weight on people aged over 35 because of their underrepresentation in the data. This introduces volatility (as shown by a large increase in the size of the confidence interval), and places a large emphasis on a relatively small number of respondents. The post-stratification weight, for example, averages 15 for those over 65 and 18 for women over 65. Second, we make the assumption that internet-using citizens (who are able to respond to the survey) would have the same view, on average, as non-internet-using citizens.
Figure 2: Percent of Respondents Adding Name to "No Guns" List, by Treatment Group

Notes: The dashed line represents the average response waiver rate (30.8%) across all subjects. N = 1,050.

The left-hand columns of Figure 2 show that subjects’ willingness to waive was not reduced by increasing the scope of the waiver to include purchase and possession. 31.0% of subjects were willing to add their name to a “No Guns” list which would prohibit them from purchasing weapons, while 30.6% of subjects were willing to add their names to a “No Guns” list which would prohibit both the purchase and the possession of guns. As discussed above, the equal willingness to waive across this dimension suggests that structuring choice to include purchase and possession might not dissuade registration. This broader waiver scope would also be consistent with current condition of individuals included on the NICS list who are prohibited from both purchasing and possessing firearms.
In contrast, both the rescission and peer arms of the test displayed statistically significant treatment effects. Subjects who were told they could automatically rescind their waiver after seven days were 6.7 percentage points more likely to waive than those who were told that they could only rescind their waiver if a state judge found that they were not a risk to themselves or others (34.1% vs. 27.4%). As shown in the right-hand columns of Figure 2, subjects were 9.2 percentage points more likely to waive if a more than half of other adults in their state also added their names than if the choices of others were not mentioned (35.4% vs. 26.2%).

We also found substantially different willingness to participate for different types of respondents. Subjects who reported having been previously “diagnosed with a mental disorder” (15.1% of the sample) or having “regular access to firearms at home” (24.3% of the sample) displayed highly variable willingness to participate.

Figure 3: Percent of Respondents Adding Name to "No Guns" List, by Mental Disorder Diagnosis and Access to Firearms

Notes: The dashed line represents the average response across all subjects. N = 1,050.

As shown in Figure 3, those with no mental health diagnosis and no access to a firearm are close to the sample mean at 33.2%. Subjects with regular access to firearms are (unsurprisingly) less likely to waive their Second Amendment rights: those with “regular access to firearm at home” are 15.6 percentage points less likely to waive. However, respondents with a diagnosed mental disorder are 9.7% more likely to waive their rights. Those who have a diagnosed mental disorder
and access to a gun are 8.9% less likely to waive their rights, but the small number of respondents in this category causes the estimate to be imprecise.

Table 1 shows the results of OLS regressions where a dummy for willingness to register is regressed on indicator variables for each of the 3 experimental arms, as well as several respondent (self-reported) characteristics. Model 1 parallels the histogram above (Figure 2) with controls testing whether the “possess or purchase,” the “stage judge,” or the “more than half” groups are statistically different than their paired counterparts. Model 2 adds a dummy for whether or not the respondents scored at or above a 7 on the Suicide Behaviors Questionnaire-Revised (SBQ-R), a cutoff that has been shown to indicate being at risk of suicide. Model 3 adds a dummy for whether the respondent self-reports as having been diagnosed with a mental disorder. Model 4 adds interactions with the random treatments. Model 5 adds a dummy indicating whether the respondent has regular access to a firearm, as well as an interaction with the mental disorder dummy. This parallels Figure 3. Model 6 adds dummies indicating if there are children in the home. Model 7 adds more than a dozen demographic controls for respondents’ race, gender, sexual orientation, age, region, income, education, and political identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Regression Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or Purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Than Half of Other Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBQ-R Score Greater Than or Equal to 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X Possess or Purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X State Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X More Than Half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Regular Access to Firearm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X Regular Access to Firearm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live with Children Under 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live with Children Under 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Demographic Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Augustine Osman et al., The Suicide Behaviors Questionnaire-Revised (SBQ-R), 8 ASSESSMENT 443 (1999).

The full regression and list of demographic controls is reported in Online Appendix Table 2.
Model 1 shows the magnitude and statistical significance of the differences shown in Figure 2. Requiring a state judge to certify that you are not a danger to yourself or to others, rather than requesting removal and waiting seven days, lowers support by 6.6 percentage points and is statistically significant (p. < .05). Conditioning signup on more than half of other adults in the state signing up statistically increases support by 9.2 percentage points, as compared simply asking if the respondent would like to sign up. But as suggested by Figure 1, there is no statistical difference in support whether the scope of waiver is framed as “purchase or possess” or merely “purchase.”

Model 2 tests whether having a SBQ-R score above 7 affects signup, and finds that it does by 5.4 percentage points, but this result is not statistically significant. However, Model 3 suggests that having been diagnosed with a mental disorder in the past is associated with increased support by 8.7 percentage points and is statistically significant (p. < .05). Model 4 interacts the mental disorder dummy with the three treatment dummy variables. Most notably, the coefficient on “Diagnosed with a Mental Disorder X State Judge” is large, negative, and statistically significant (p. < .05). This indicates that those who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder are 16.6 percentage points less likely to sign up if required to convince state judge that they are not a danger to themselves or others (as opposed to simply requesting to take their name off and waiting seven days). Concomitant with this effect is the lack of statistical significance on the uninteracted “State Judge” variable, indicating that those who have not been diagnosed with mental disorders are, statistically, equally willing to add their names even if they must go before a state judge to have it later removed.

Model 5 indicates that those with regular access to a firearm are less willing to voluntarily give up their Second Amendment rights by 15.4 percentage points. This effect is stable for those who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder. Model 6 shows that support does not seem to be affected by the presence of children in the household.

Model 7 adds full demographic controls to Model 6 (see Online Appendix Table 3 for full results). Women are 8.4 percentage points more likely to sign up than men. Asian, Black, and Hispanic respondents were all more than 10 percentage points more likely to sign up than White respondents (11.9, 15.9, and 19.7 percentage points, respectively). Registered Democrats were also statistically much more likely to be willing to waive their Second Amendment rights than Republicans, independents, and those who are not registered to vote.

D. The Alabama Survey

The high sign-up rates reported above for those diagnosed with a mental disorder (42.9%) are consistent with an independent study assessing the willingness of individuals to self-restrict firearm.120 In an anonymous survey administered at in an inpatient psychiatric unit and two

120 Fredrick E. Vars et al., Willingness of Mentally Ill Individuals to Sign Up for a Novel Proposal To Prevent Firearm Suicide, 47 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 483 (2016).
outpatient psychiatric clinics at an academic medical center, 46% of 200 psychiatric patients in Alabama said they would volunteer for either the 7-day or judicial-hearing versions of the proposal.121

A similar proportion (39%) of MTurk respondents who reported being diagnosed with a mental health disorder were willing to self-restrict – even though there were important differences in the subject population and survey methodology. The off-line Alabama survey offered a much more extensive rationale for the proposals than did the MTurk survey. Alabama has the seventh highest gun ownership rate in the United States122 and a strong consensus against gun regulation,123 and a slightly higher proportion of Alabama respondents relative to MTurk respondents reported access to firearms (26% vs. 24%), so the sign-up rate might be higher in other states with lower rates of gun ownership and less resistance to gun regulation.

The MTurk survey also confirmed several other secondary findings from the Alabama study. Those with current access to a gun were significantly less likely to volunteer (though 18.7% still did). Whites were less likely to sign up for the judicial hearing option in the earlier study, which was also consistent with the MTurk results. The SBQ-R score was not significantly associated with sign-up rates in either study. And the presence of children in the home had no statistically meaningful effect.

E. Estimated Lives Saved

The substantial sign-up rates found in both the Alabama and MTurk surveys suggest that the proposal could save hundreds of lives each year. In 2013, there were 23,845 suicides in states without waiting periods.124 In the MTurk survey, 31% indicated they would sign up for the proposal with the seven-day delay removal option.125 It is unreasonable to think that a 31% waiver rate would translate into a 31% reduction in suicides. Some individuals who waive would access guns by waiting or from other sources.126 Others would kill themselves by other means. However, a large and sophisticated study found a 6% reduction in suicide for handgun purchase waiting

---

121 Id.
122 Bindu Kalesan, Marcos D Villarreal, Katherine M. Keyes & Sandro Galea, Gun Ownership and Social Gun Culture, INJURY PREVENTION (2015).
125 See supra Fig.1.
126 Jeffrey W. Swanson, et. al, Gun Violence, Mental Illness, And Laws That Prohibit Gun Possession: Evidence From Two Florida Counties, 35 Health Aff 1067 (2016) (noting that 28 percent of gun suicides involved individuals not legally permitted to have a gun at the time).
periods seven days or longer. If we assume a 6% reduction in suicide of those who sign up, our proposal could be expected to save approximately 440 lives. At the government’s statistical value of human life, this amounts in economic terms to an annual benefit of more than $4 billion – far outstripping the modest and largely one-time costs of creating the registry platform as a modest add-on to the FBI’s existing program.

Moreover, as mentioned above, there are good reasons to expect this estimate of lives saved to be a lower bound. It assumes that a 31% registration rate and a 6% decline in suicide rate for registrants in states without waiting periods. But both these assumptions are conservative. Negotiated exclusion could substantially increase the population proportion that registers. And those who register may experience more than a 6% decline in suicide both because our surveys suggest that those more at risk are more likely to register, and because those registrants providing emails may trigger productive third-party interventions if registrants later attempt to rescind their waiver. All things considered, one could easily imagine the system saving one or two thousand lives a year.

III. **LIBERTARIAN CONTRACTING AND ITS LIMITS**

While giving individuals the unfettered, unilateral discretion to waive their right to bear arms is consonant with the libertarian embrace of self-authorship, the negotiated-exclusion aspect of our proposal created by the email option raises separate concerns about government’s burdening of individuals’ Second Amendment rights. From one perspective, negotiated exclusion where waiver is induced by the threat of private third-parties to withhold commercial or non-commercial association does not raise constitutional concerns because it does not involve any state action. But the email option does involve the government as a facilitator. The government facilitates the associational marketplace by credibly communicating waiver information (if so directed by the registrant) to third-parties.

If a state created a similar registry that gave women the option to have the state credibly communicate to third parties if they have an abortion, merely facilitating an associational marketplace would raise concerns about whether the government’s facilitating role would

---

128 23,845 x .308 x .06 = 440.7
130 The powerful potential effect of gun removal on suicide is underscored by a recent analysis of Connecticut’s Gun Violence Restraining Orders (GVROs), which allow third-party petitions for gun removal where person poses risk of “imminent personal injury to self or others.” Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., *Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides?*, LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, (forthcoming 2016) (estimating “approximately 1 averted suicide for every 10 to 11 gun seizure cases”).
131 The constitutionality of self-exclusion with regard to Second Amendment rights has separately been analyzed. Vars, *supra* note 6; Selvaggio & Vars, *supra* note 6.
constitute an “undue burden” on the exercise of this fundamental right. On the other hand, a
government registry that gave registered voters the option of credibly communicating whether or
not they exercised their right to vote would almost certainly be constitutional. Indeed many state
governments, without constitutional challenge, already do more than merely give citizens the
option of communicating this to others; many states publicize whether specific citizens voted or
not in specific elections. The Constitutional jurisprudence of whether government can compel
disclosure of whether individuals exercise constitutional rights is not well specified – with
mandated disclosure of voting allowed but with mandated disclosure of associational membership,
in cases like NAACP v. Alabama, prohibited.

But our email option does not concern a government-compelled disclosure. Instead the
email option merely involves the government giving private individuals the option of having their
registration verified to third parties chosen by the individual. The constitutionality of government
merely giving individual the option of having government disclose the exercise of a constitutional
right of has never been addressed (to our knowledge) by a court. The government act of literally
sending the email does constitute a kind of state action. The government’s action verifies that an
individual has registered (or is revoking their registration) and may give particular salience to this
piece of information. The mere fact that the government’s action is triggered by and contingent
on a private option does not immunize the state action from constitutional scrutiny.

Imagine, for example, that the state of Louisiana gave candidates the option of having their
race listed on election ballots and the state did this for the purpose of facilitating private
discrimination against African-American candidates. In 1964, the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Martin struck down an analogous Louisiana statute which compelled the designation of candidate
race on ballots. The Court reasoned that “by directing the citizen's attention to the single
consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color is an important—
perhaps paramount—consideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively influence the
citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.” Our hypothetical which mere gave candidates the
option of having the state report their race on ballots would similarly be constitutionally infirm.
The illegitimate purpose of facilitating private discrimination “by directing the citizen’s attention
to the single consideration of race” would still likely be impermissible notwithstanding that any

---

132 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (stating that state restriction is an undue burden if it has
"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus").
133 Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & Christopher W. Larimer, Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a
(striking down Virginia statute requiring membership list disclosure).
136 Id. at 433. See also Sonu Bedi, Online Dating Sites as Public Accommodations: Facilitating Racial Discrimination
Gelber) (arguing that by offering race filtering options, Roomates.com facilitates private associational discrimination).
discrimination would be the byproduct of state and private action. The Supreme Court in *NAACP v. Alabama*, in striking down a compulsory disclosure statute, emphasized:

> It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner's activities follows not from state action, but from private community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold.¹³⁷

Similarly, it is the interplay of governmental and private action at play with regard to the email option that raises the question whether “private community pressures” might unconstitutionally burden individuals’ exercise of their Second Amendment rights.

As in other areas, the constitutionality of government merely offering to verify may turn on the government’s underlying purpose.¹³⁸ The hypothetical Louisiana ballot option is unconstitutional because the previously assumed purpose of facilitating private race discrimination is illegitimate. In contrast, a state which gave voters the option of having the state publicly disclose that they had voted is likely not unconstitutional state action even if the state’s purpose in granting the option was to cause more people to exercise their right to vote because that government purpose is likely to be deemed legitimate.

The Supreme Court’s abortion decisions make clear that government need not passively accept how citizens choose to exercise their constitutional rights. For example, in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, the Court held: “[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when, in so doing, the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion.”¹³⁹ The purpose of expressing a State “preference for childbirth over abortion” is constitutionally permissible.¹⁴⁰

Given this jurisprudence, we think it is likely also constitutionally permissible for a state to pass laws that have a purpose of expressing a State’s preference for not bearing over bearing arms. The public health concerns of gun deaths each year in tens of thousands provide ample evidence to support the legitimacy of a government preference for reducing the prevalence of gun

---

¹³⁸ *See* *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding valid laws that have a racially disparate impact but were not enacted with a discriminatory intent).
¹⁴⁰ *See also* *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (“The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. . . . It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions.”).
possession. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a court concluding that “protecting the life of the born” would not be as legitimate as “protecting the life of the unborn.”

Opponents of the email option might nonetheless argue that the means of pursuing this government purpose by using “private community pressures” may unconstitutionally burden the individual’s right to bear arms. In *Buckley v. Valeo*, the Supreme Court in rejecting a facial constitutional challenge to certain mandated disclosures of campaign contributions, nonetheless carved out a potential exception where “where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.”141 The Court worried that “compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.”142

Without offering a definitive normative analysis of the Constitutional limits to the government as facilitator, several aspects of our email options argue strongly in favor in the constitutionality of our proposal. First, courts have already ruled that compelled public disclosure of gun permits can be constitutional. In *CBS v. Block*, the California Supreme Court upheld the right of “press and public” under the California Public Records Act to obtain information about the identity of those licensed to possess concealed weapons, in the face of a dissent which expressly considered the *NAACP v. Alabama* possibility that disclosure might expose licensees to "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."143 The Nevada Supreme Court held similarly in 2010.144 While now legislatively repealed, New York state law until 2014 compelled disclosure of the identity of all gun permit holders – thereby identifying all individuals possessing guns.145 In comparison to this compelled public disclosure of all gun possessors or all people with concealed carry permits, our email proposal only discloses if the person electing not to possess chooses to have the registry send emails to particular addressees. Our registrant-chosen target disclosure emails present a stronger case for being constitutionally permissible than the compelled disclosure regimes that have survived repeated challenge.

Our model statute further tailors the scope of email option to pass constitutional muster by prohibiting any commercial actor from refusing to contract on the basis of registry status unless the commercial actor has a sufficient self-defense interest in discouraging firearm possession by

---

142 Id. Subsequently, the Communist Party provided such evidence and was exempted from disclosing the identity of its contributors. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982).
143 CBS, Inc. v. Block, 725 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1986) (“Defendants’ concern that the release of the information to the press would increase the vulnerability of licensees is conjectural at best.”); id. at 476 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting *N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama*, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
particular individuals. In *Heller*, the Supreme Court held that individual self-defense was “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.\(^{146}\) The right to disassociate with people who possess arms is constitutionally at its strongest when the person disassociating is also making a decision about how best to defend their home – where, as *Heller* explained, “the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”\(^{147}\) Thus, our email option does not just make Second Amendment firearm rights contend with First Amendment associational rights, our associational marketplace makes one person’s self-defense preferences contend with another person’s constitutionally-equal self-defense preferences.

In June 2016, Anne Verrill, the owner of two restaurants in Portland, Maine posted a photo of an AR-15 assault rifle along with the message: “If you own this gun, or you condone the ownership of this gun for private use, you may no longer enter either of my restaurants . . . .”\(^{148}\) If our email proposal was adopted, one might imagine that this owner would demand credible evidence that patrons had waived their right to possess firearms as a precondition of service. But our self-defense limitation would prohibit such discrimination. While a restaurant owner has a legitimate basis for prohibiting customers (or others) from carrying firearms onto her property,\(^{149}\) she does not have a sufficient self-defense basis for refusing to serve customers who possess firearms remotely. Just as the *Masterpiece Cakeshop* baker was prohibited from refusing to make a cake for a same-sex wedding,\(^{150}\) our proposal would prohibit most retail sellers from refusing to sell to gun possessors.

With an abundance of caution, our proposal would only allow those who live with or near the potential registrant or those who have an insurance interest in the potential waiver’s residence or life to condition their willingness to contract on waiver. Thus, our model statute would allow cotenants, landlords, homeowners’ and condominium associations to condition an individual’s residency upon registering to waive his or her Second Amendment rights.\(^{151}\) And as argued above, life and property insurers as well as landlords have sufficient property interests in defending the potential waiver’s residence and/or continued life to justify conditioning insurance or its terms on an individual’s waiver status.

A powerful case could be made for also allowing employers to condition employment on workers’ non-possession of firearms. As mentioned above, there were 14,770 workplace homicide

---

\(^{146}\) District of Columbia v. *Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (stating that the “inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right”). *See also* McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).

\(^{147}\) *Id.*


\(^{149}\) See infra Part V.


\(^{151}\) See infra Appendix.
victims between 1992 and 2012.\textsuperscript{152} The very term, “going postal,” derives from “a series of sensational murders at U.S. Postal Service branches” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.\textsuperscript{153} A reasonable employer might decide that employee gun possession makes the workplace less safe. Nonetheless, our model statute prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of waiver status.

While we limit the ability of some commercial contractors to discriminate on the basis of registry status, we place no such limitation on the non-commercial associational choices. Private citizens under our proposal would be free to withhold love, affection, and friendship to people who failed to register (as signaled by the email option). Neighbors could refuse to fraternize or allow their kids to have play dates or sleepovers on this basis. While the associational First Amendment rights of commercial actors, like their free-speech First Amendment rights, are subject to constitutional restriction,\textsuperscript{154} we are chary to restrict the associational rights of non-commercial individuals and organizations.\textsuperscript{155} Individuals’ choice not to renounce their Second Amendment rights might limit their ability to interact with others in non-economic spheres, but they remain free to find their own communities of kindred spirits.

In weighing the burdens of the email option on the self-defense choices of potential registrants, it is essential to also take into account the concomitant benefits that the email option produces with regard to the same constitutional values. For example, consider a potential registrant who only registers because of the associational pressure of losing the right to associate with a neighbor who conditions their association on receiving an email. We can say that the registrant’s self-defense choices were burdened by the email option (and the possibility of associational pressure that it created). But the email option \textit{furthers} the associational interests and self-defense interests of the neighbor. The neighbor can make more informed associational choices and thereby further her self-defense preference of being less exposed to potentially armed interactions. A similar analysis applies to those potential registrants who when faced with association pressure still choose not to register. We can again say that the non-registrant’s self-defense choices were burdened by the email option — because the price of bearing arms is forgoing association with the neighbor. But the email option again furthers the association and self-defense of the neighbor who by disassociation can again further her self-defense preference of being less exposed to potentially armed interactions. In both these cases, there is a symmetry of constitutional interests. However, there is a final pairing where the email option furthers the associational interests of both the registrant and the (pressuring) neighbor. Without the email option, there may be people who want to register independent of any associational pressure who are still unable to engage in certain forms of association because they are not able to credibly communicate their unarmed status to their neighbor. In this situation, the email option furthers the constitutional interests of both the registrant and the neighbors because the credible signal of registry allows

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{152} CDC, \textit{Occupational Violence}, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/violence. [visited July 20, 2016]
\bibitem{153} \textsc{Linda Hamilton Krieger}, \textit{Backlash Against the ADA: Reinterpreting Disability Rights} 192 (2010).
\bibitem{154} \textit{Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees}, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); \textit{see also} Gershman & Audi, \textit{supra} note 150.
\end{thebibliography}
them to achieve association that also comports with their shared self-defense choice that the registrant not be armed. Thus, even if a court were to assess the associational pressure of the neighbor as constitutional burden, it would need to balance the offsetting benefits regarding the same associational and self-defense interests.

Stepping back, we have proposed a system of limited government intervention to promote informed association by reporting registration only when commercial contractors without sufficient self-defense interests – including employers and virtually all retailers of goods and services – would be prohibited from discriminating against someone for failing to waive the rights to purchase or possess firearms. The email option is a modest form of state action where the state in a sense agrees to pass along a registrant message to particular addressees (and by doing so verifies that the registry or revocation has in fact occurred). While the exact contours of any possible constitutional duty on government to refrain from facilitating associational preferences are debatable, we are confident our proposed email option – given (i) the constitutionality of compelled public disclosure of various gun permits and (2) our prohibiting associational discrimination by commercial contractors without sufficient self-defense interests in the firearm choices of others – passes constitutional muster.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Our proposal could be implemented by a Congressional statute adding individuals who registered to waive their purchase and possession rights as an addition NICS category. However, federal firearms legislation has historically been difficult to pass. A more politically viable alternative is for individual states to implement the proposal by exploiting an existing state option to expand NICS coverage. The existing federal background check system already allows states to add categories of covered individuals into the NICS system – because under the federal law, the NICS system prohibits transfer of a firearm where barred by federal or state law. Individual states have already taken advantage of this option to expand the class of prohibited individuals. For example, Illinois prohibits people who have voluntarily admitted themselves within the past five years to “a mental health institution for mental health treatment.” In effect, Illinois already

156 With regard to all of these contractors, an individual’s right to possess to bear arms would be market-inalienable. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (“Something that is market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to be traded in the market.”).

157 Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive Blocked in Senate; Obama, In Defeat, Sees ’Shameful Day,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1. Even lifting the ban on federal funding of gun research is highly contested. David Smith, Obama Looks to Expand Background Checks for Guns with Executive Action White House Says It Is Also Exploring So-Called Gun Show Loophole As House Democrats Push To Have Federal Ban on Gun Violence Research Funding Lifted, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), 2016 WLNR 14430252 (May 11, 2016).


has a version of our proposed libertarian gun control, because by volunteering to be admitted, an individual waives the right to possess or purchase firearms for the next five years. As of 2013, more than 100,000 individuals were included in NICS solely because they were prohibited from possessing firearms under state law (and hence under NICS are categorized as “state prohibitors”). An individual state could accordingly implement our proposal for “libertarian gun control” by simply creating a state waiver registry and passing legislation making it illegal for residents who register to possess or purchase firearms. This state statute would thereby create a new prohibitor category, and the residents who registered with the state would then automatically qualify for inclusion in the NICS system. The state on an ongoing basis would forward registrant information to the FBI, and the resident registrants would then be barred from purchasing firearms anywhere in the nation.

In fact, by creating a new category of individuals who cannot lawfully possess firearms, a state can not only prevent its resident registrants from purchasing guns in other states, but it can also prevent non-residents from purchasing guns in that state. As explained in the FBI’s Federal Firearm Licensee Manual, “The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) is required to deny the transfer of a firearm to any individual who is found to be prohibited under state law, i.e., under the law of the purchaser’s state of residence and/or the law of the state where the transfer occurs.” As shown in Table 2, a state’s prohibitor category would only not apply if the person with the prohibitor characteristic was not a resident of the prohibitor state and was not attempting to purchase in the prohibitor state. Accordingly, if a single state passed such a “No Guns Registry” statute, it could create a small commitment gift for residents of other states as well, because these residents of other states who registered with the passing states registry would be barred from purchasing guns in the passing state.

---

160 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
161 The NICS system allows states to choose whether to maintain their own databases for at least some background checks. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.2 (providing that state point of contact can “check state and local record systems,” as well as NICS). As of 2013, in 29 states, dealers contacted the FBI directly for all background checks. F.B.I., supra note 158. But all states have the option of passing on names of persons who fall into a prohibited possession category to the FBI, so our proposal would merely be adding a new prohibitor category that could be transmitted. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.4 (stating that reporting by states to NICS is voluntary).
162 F.B.I., NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEE MANUAL 2, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/federal-firearms-licensees/ffl-manual [downloaded May 23, 2016] But cf. 27 C.F.R. § 478.99 (barring interstate handgun transfers and stating that sellers may not sell to buyers who are too young under state law “applicable at the place of sale”); Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (holding interstate handgun transfer ban unconstitutional). The broadest reading of “State law,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(4), (5), under the federal background check statute would prevent purchase in every state by anyone barred by any state’s law. Longstanding principles of extraterritoriality and choice-of-law militate against such an interpretation Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Crimes and offenses against the laws of any state can only be defined, prosecuted, and pardoned by the sovereign authority of that state.”), but do not preclude it: “[C]oncerns regarding extraterritorial effects of state law are misplaced. We are dealing with a federal statute which has incorporated state law into its application. Upon incorporation, that state law became a part of the federal statutory scheme; so, it is federal law being given effect, not state law.” In re Stockburger, 192 B.R. 908, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
Table 2: Extraterritorial Effect of State Prohibitor (including “No Guns” Waiver)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Place of Purchase or Possession</th>
<th>Prohibiting State</th>
<th>Non-Prohibiting State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibiting State</td>
<td>Applies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Applies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Prohibiting State</td>
<td>Applies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Does Not Apply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, our proposed statute provides for reciprocity that would allow a subset of states to increase the footprint of a registration’s effect. Crucially, the statute provides that “registering in any other state that adopts an analogous “No Guns” registry renders possession of a firearm illegal” in other passing jurisdictions.\(^{163}\) Thus, if California and Illinois both passed the model statute, then anyone who registered in either state could not then legally possess or possess in either state. We do not anticipate that our model statute would be enacted in many states at once, but we can easily imagine gradual passage by states that have shown an appetite for various other firearms restrictions.\(^{164}\)

**CONCLUSION**

In this Article, we have laid out a plan for a new kind of gun control that is inexpensive, politically feasible, and likely, within just a few years, to save thousands of lives. Our proposal to allow individuals to waive their Second Amendment rights is inexpensive because it merely calls for an on-line registry to supplement the existing NICS system. Our proposal does not add any additional burdens on gun dealers who already have to query the NICS system before selling.

The “No Guns Registry” is politically feasible not only because of its libertarian and freedom-enhancing quality, but also because it can be implemented by individual states without requiring Congressional action. Indeed, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts and the District of Columbia have already enacted a version of our proposal by allowing individuals to opt into the NICS system by volunteering to be committed for mental health purposes. There are good reasons why we might be concerned about such waivers via voluntary commitment, as the individuals at

---

\(^{163}\) See infra Appendix, Section 3.

\(^{164}\) States that are already voluntarily reporting to NICS large numbers of people disqualified by federal mental health restrictions might be the most likely to enact. The top ten reporting states are Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware, California, Washington, Michigan, New York, Texas, and Colorado. EVERYTOWN, CLOSING THE GAPS: STRENGTHENING THE BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM TO KEEP GUNS AWAY FROM THE DANGEROUSLY MENTALLY ILL 12 (2014).

Under the FBI’s current interpretation that “state law” includes either the transaction state or the buyer’s state of residence, see *supra* text accompanying note 162, residents of any state that passes the model statute would be barred from purchasing nationwide. But the reciprocity would broaden the scope of resident registrants in the circumstance that the federal government limited NICS to the place of transaction. Under that interpretation, a registrant in California would be barred from purchasing in either California or Illinois. To implement reciprocity, enacting states would need to share registrant information with each other (as is provided in Section 2 of the model statute). See Appendix.
the moment of voluntary commitment may have reduced decisional capacity and we worry that the Second Amendment consequences of waiver are not sufficiently disclosed. It is worrisome that people in these states are forced give up their constitutional right as a pre-condition for receiving mental health care. But our proposal avoids these concerns. The registry does not systematically target people in extremis and fully discloses the consequences of waiver, including the process for subsequently rescinding the waiver. Moreover, the option of waiver is not a government required quid pro quo for mental health or any other services. While our email option allows individual neighbors, cotenants, and insurers to require waiver as an associational prerequisite, non-waiving individuals are free to seek out other associational communities making different self-defense decisions.

The “No Guns Registry” sees government not simply as a source of mandates and prohibitions but as a platform that can facilitate citizens coming together to make common cause. Instead of traditional state action, the government as platform merely facilitates citizen action. Our registry platform not only facilitates the associational marketplace of those most affected by individual gun-acquisition decisions, it allows millions of geographically dispersed Americans to publicly signal their aggregate willingness to dispense with firearms.

While we have structured our proposal to appeal to people with varying political commitments, reasonable people nonetheless oppose this enhancement of individual freedom. People might oppose the email option because they predict that a disassociation marketplace will reduce social cohesion by unhelpfully moving us toward an overly transparent world in which citizens can base their willingness to interact on a host of personal choices that have been largely shrouded. Alternatively, people might oppose the registry more generally out of a fear that it might either facilitate or impede the enactment of other gun-control measures. For example, citizens who would have supported an across-the-board mandatory waiting period as a commitment device may become quiescent once they can opt for their own. Or the legislative energy necessary to enact a waiver registry may divert attention from other gun control initiatives that might have larger impacts on public safety. On the other hand, if the associational marketplace “decides” that a substantial majority of citizens support waiver, this demonstration of support might lead legislators toward imposing a waiting period before all gun sales.

But to condition one’s support crudely on whether our proposal is likely to increase or decrease the prevalence of private possession of firearms continues the divisive trap that has plagued our national debate on gun control. The associational marketplace lets the people decide what kinds of self-defense communities they desire. It acknowledges the varying spillover effects that one person’s decision to possess may have on others and on his or her future self. Giving

---

165 See Ayres, supra note 42, at 33 (“[T]he same advances in technology that have made Kickstarter and Groupon possible can be leveraged to allow new sets of similarly-minded citizens to make common cause.”).

166 Analogous possible demotivating effects of personal freedom can be found in many contexts. Giving retailers the individual option of banning guns in their stores may discourage them from lobbying for mandatory gun control. Giving individual passengers the option of seatbelts may discourage them from lobbying for air bags.
people the right to waive their gun rights is not a silver-bullet solution to gun violence, but it is a low-cost and pragmatic enhancement of our liberty that can, by garnering the substantial support our two studies demonstrate, predictably save hundreds of lives each year.
APPENDIX

Model Firearm Self-Restriction Act

SYNOPSIS: Under current law, people who fear that they may become a risk to themselves or others are not allowed to restrict their legal ability to purchase firearms.

This bill would authorize people to add their own names into the background check system to protect themselves and others against impulsive gun violence.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF [STATE]:

Section 1. [The STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR NICS REPORTING] within one-year of the passage of this Act shall develop and launch a secure Internet-based platform to allow any person residing in the United States to register to add their name to the “[STATE] No Guns Registry.”

(a) The [AGENCY] shall assure that this Internet-based platform credibly (i) verifies the identity of any persons who opt to register, (ii) prevents unauthorized disclosures of any registering persons, and (iii) informs the individual of the legal effects of registration.

(b) In addition, the Internet-based platform provide registrants with an email notification option that shall allow registered individuals to identify at the time of registration or thereafter one or more email addresses. The platform will separately ask whether a registrant wishes to provide the email addresses of his or her physician or healthcare provider. The platform shall notify any such email addressees that the individual has registered his or her name with the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” and has thereby waived his or her right to bear arms, and the platform shall also notify any such addressees if the individual subsequently seeks to rescind his or her waiver. Providing email contact information constitutes an express authorization of such use of records.

Section 2. Once the Internet-based platform becomes operative, any person may request via the platform to be added to the “[STATE] No Guns Registry.” The [AGENCY] shall on an ongoing basis forward registry information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be entered into the NICS Index Denied Persons File, and to any other state that adopts an analogous “No Guns Registry.”

Section 3. Registering for the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” or registering in any other state that adopts an analogous “No Guns Registry” renders possession of a firearm illegal in [STATE]. If a person is in the NICS due to registering in [STATE] or in another state, receipt of a firearm from a person or entity required to perform a background check violates [STATE] law. Knowing possession of a firearm by a person validly registered on the “No Guns Registry” is punishable by a fine of up to $500. Transfer of a firearm to a person on the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” by any person or entity required to perform a background check, either knowingly or due to a failure
to perform a background check, is punishable by a fine up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for no more than one year.

Section 4. A person who has registered with the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” may subsequently request that his or her name be removed from the registry by a secure method conveyed to the [STATE]’s Internet-based platform. The [AGENCY] shall wait twenty-one days after receipt, before notifying the FBI to remove the requesting person from the NICS Index Denied Persons File and then the [AGENCY] shall purge any and all records of the sign-up, transactions, and removal. A person who has registered with the [STATE] No Guns Registry may deregister by applying for immediate deregistration to a Superior Court by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety (including danger to self) in a proceeding where any public official or interested party may also present evidence.

Section 5. A person who knowingly makes a false statement regarding their identity on the voluntary waiver of firearm rights form or revocation of waiver of firearm rights form is guilty of false swearing under [cite relevant section].

Section 6. (a) In employment, education, government benefits, and contracting, it shall be illegal to inquire whether an individual under this Section has requested to be added to or removed from the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” and it shall be illegal to take action based such information. However, notwithstanding the foregoing prohibition, it shall not be illegal for an insurer with regard to life, homeowners or renter’s insurance to inquire or base the terms, premia or issuance of insurance on such information. Nor shall it be illegal for a cotenant, landlord, homeowner’s association, or condominium association to condition terms of ownership, tenancy, occupancy, or status as an invitee on such information.

(b) Individuals or organizations who learn, from the “[STATE] No Guns Registry” or otherwise, the identity of someone who has requested to be added to or removed from the registry shall have a duty not to disclose that information to others unless the individual or organization receives separate non-registry authorization from the waiving individual to share that information. Violation of this section shall be criminally punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for no more than one year.

Section 7. A person voluntarily presenting in an acute-care hospital or a satellite emergency facility who is reasonably believed by the treating clinician to be suffering from a diagnosis of depression, using standardized definition of such diagnosis as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as published by the American Psychiatric Association, shall be presented with the opportunity of registering on the Internet-based “[STATE] No Guns Registry.” Any suicide hotline maintained or operated by any entity funded in whole or part by the state shall inform callers about the opportunity of registering with the registry. All Department of Motor Vehicle offices serving the public shall offer individuals the opportunity of registering on the Internet-based “[STATE] No Guns Registry.”